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We describe the major features of a post-2012 international global climate policy architecture
with three essential elements:  a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are
involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets;
and inclusion of  flexible market-based policy instruments to keep costs down and facilitate
international equity.  This architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science,
economics, and politics of global climate change; addresses specific shortcomings of the Kyoto
Protocol; and builds upon the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.
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Length:  12,000 words*Olmstead is Associate Professor of Environmental Economics, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale
University; and Visiting Scholar, Resources for the Future.  Stavins is Albert Pratt Professor of Business and
Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; University Fellow, Resources for the Future;
and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research.
1Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the primary anthropogenic driver of climate change.  Other important anthropogenic
greenhouse gases are methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and various halocarbons (Watson 2001).
2The general importance of focusing on policy “architecture” and institutions in the global climate domain was first
emphasized by Schmalensee (1998).
3Annex I of the UNFCCC and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol are often used interchangeably to represent the
industrialized countries that have commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, although there are a few countries that are
included in one Annex but not the other.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The nations of the world continue to negotiate the post-2012 (or post-Kyoto) climate regime.
This is happening, most centrally, through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), which includes the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15), scheduled
for Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009.  In addition, the key emitting countries of the world
have been holding a series of meetings under the auspices of the Major Economies Forum, and a
number of nations have been meeting in various other multilateral and bilateral venues.  In all of
these processes, the major goal is to develop international cooperation to address climate change
when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012.
The Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 1997), which came into force in February 2005 and
which began to bind for ratified countries in 2008, represents the first significant multinational
attempt to curb the greenhouse gas emissions that are changing the global climate.
1  The Protocol
has both strengths and weaknesses that can provide lessons for the design of future international
climate policy architecture.
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1.1  Looking Back:  The Kyoto Protocol’s Strengths and Weaknesses
Among the Kyoto Protocol’s strengths is its inclusion of several provisions for market-based
approaches intended to improve the cost-effectiveness of the global climate regime:  emissions
trading among Annex I countries
3 that take on targets under the Protocol; “joint implementation”
which allows for project-level trades among the Annex I countries; and the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), which provides for the use of project-level emission offsets created in
non-Annex I (developing) countries to help meet the compliance obligations of firms in Annex I
countries.4Nonparticipation by the United States is quantitatively important, since it is responsible for approximately 19 percent
of global CO2 emissions (Gregg et al. 2008).
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A second advantage of the Kyoto Protocol is that it provides flexibility for nations to meet
their national emissions targets — their commitments — in any way they want.  In other words, the
Protocol recognizes domestic sovereignty (in Article 2) by providing for flexibility at the national
level.  The political importance of this provision in terms of making it possible for a large number
of nations to reach agreement should not be underestimated.
Third, the Kyoto Protocol has at least the appearance of fairness in that it focuses on the
wealthiest countries and those responsible for the majority of the current stock of anthropogenic
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  This is consistent with the principle enunciated in the
UNFCCC of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” 
Fourth and finally, the fact that the Kyoto Protocol was signed by more than 180 countries
and subsequently ratified by a sufficient number of Annex I countries for it to come into force
speaks to the political viability of the agreement in terms of participation, if not feasibility in terms
of compliance.
The Kyoto Protocol also has some weaknesses that can provide valuable lessons for the path
forward.  First, some of the world’s leading greenhouse gas emitters are not constrained by the
Protocol.  The United States — until recently the country with the largest share of global emissions
— has not ratified and is unlikely to ratify the agreement.
4  Also, some of the largest, most rapidly
growing economies in the world do not take on targets under the agreement, including China, India,
Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, South Korea, and Mexico.  The reality is that the developing world
will soon overtake the industrialized world in total emissions.  Indeed, China’s CO2 emissions have
surpassed those of the United States (Gregg et al. 2008); and China’s emissions are expected to
continue to grow much faster than U.S. emissions (Blanford, et al. 2008).  
The anticipated growth paths of emissions in the various countries of the world clearly
indicate that even if the Annex I countries, including the United States (that is, the currently
industrialized countries) were to reduce their CO2 emissions to zero by 2020 to 2030, it would still
be physically impossible for the world to achieve the frequently discussed climate target of
stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at or below 450 parts per million (ppm).  Furthermore,
the Kyoto Protocol may not be as fair as originally intended, given how dramatically the world has
changed since the UNFCCC divided countries into two categories in 1992.  For example,
approximately 50 non-Annex I countries now have higher per capita income than the poorest of the
Annex I countries with commitments under Kyoto.
A second weakness of the Kyoto Protocol is the relatively small number of countries who
have agreed to take action.  This “narrow but deep” approach will drive up the costs of producing
carbon-intensive goods and services within the coalition of countries taking action, which is fully
appropriate as a means to reduce emissions.  But through the forces of international trade, this
approach also leads to greater comparative advantage in the production of carbon-intensive goods
and services for countries that do not have binding emissions targets, thereby shifting production
and emissions from participating nations to non-participating nations — a phenomenon known as5The countries of the European Union (EU) have opted to use an emissions trading system (EU ETS), operating in pilot
form from 2005 through 2007, and in earnest since 2008, to meet their emissions reduction targets, but that system is
not part of the Article 17 trading system.
6The theory behind the claim that a cap-and-trade system will be cost effective depends upon the participants being
cost-minimizing entities.  In the case of private-sector firms, this is a reasonable assumption, because if firms do not seek,
and indeed succeed in, minimizing their costs, they will tend to disappear, given the competitive forces of the market.
But nation-states are not simple cost-minimizers — many other objectives affect their decision-making.  Furthermore,
even if nation-states sought to minimize costs, they do not have sufficient information about marginal abatement costs
at the multitude of sources within their borders to carry out cost-effective trades with other countries (Hahn and Stavins
1999).
7When an individual project results in emissions below what they would have been in the absence of the project, a credit
— which may be sold to a source within a cap-and-trade system — is generated.  This approach creates a challenge:
comparing actual emissions with what they would have been otherwise.  The baseline — what would have happened
had the project not been implemented — is fundamentally unobservable. In fact, there is a natural tendency, because of
economic incentives, to claim credits precisely for those projects that are most profitable, and hence would have been
most likely to have been executed without the promise of credits.  This is the “additionality” problem.
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“emissions leakage.”  Leakage will reduce the cost-effectiveness and environmental performance
of the agreement, and worse yet, push developing countries onto more carbon-intensive growth paths
than they would otherwise have taken, rendering it more difficult for these countries to join the
coalition of action later.
A third concern about the Kyoto Protocol centers on the nature of its emissions trading
elements.  The provision in Article 17 for international emissions trading 
5 is unlikely to be effective,
if indeed it is utilized at all, because the trading would need to be among national governments, not
private-sector firms (Hahn and Stavins 1999).
6  And there is great concern regarding the CDM,
which is not a cap-and-trade mechanism, but an emissions-reduction-credit system, and thereby
raises concerns about the “additionality” of generated offsets.
7  In principle, this and related
concerns could be addressed to some degree through future restructuring and reform of the CDM.
Fourth, the Kyoto Protocol, with its five-year time horizon (2008 to 2012), represents a
relatively short-term approach for what is fundamentally a long-term problem.  Greenhouse gases
reside in the atmosphere for decades to centuries.  Furthermore, to encourage the magnitude of
technological change that will be required to meaningfully address the threat of climate change, it
will be necessary to send long-term signals to the private market that stimulate sustained investment
and technological innovation (Newell 2008).
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol may not provide sufficient incentives for countries to comply
(Barrett 2008).  Some countries’ emissions have grown so fast since 1990 that it is difficult to
imagine that they can undertake the emission mitigation or muster the political will and resources
to purchase enough emission allowances or CDM credits from other countries to comply with their
targets under the Protocol.  In short, the enforcement mechanism negotiated for the Kyoto Protocol
does not appear to induce policy responses consistent with agreed upon targets.8For a summary of critiques of the Kyoto Protocol and alternatives that have been proposed, see Aldy, Barrett and
Stavins (2003).  A comprehensive survey of proposals is provided by Bodansky (2004).
9Our claim that a consensus continues to form regarding the likelihood of future climate change due to anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases and regarding the desirability, from an economic perspective, of some long-term actions
to address the threat does not suggest that there is unanimity either with regard to the science or the economics.  See,
for example, Lindzen (1992, 2008).  In this paper, we simply take as given the desirability of limiting long-term
concentrations of CO2 (and other greenhouse gases) in the atmosphere.  For examinations of dynamically efficient
policies (which maximize present value net benefits), see:  Hammitt 1999; Nordhaus and Boyer 2000; and McKibbin
and Wilcoxen 2002.
10Given the global commons nature of the climate problem, a multinational—if not fully global—approach is required.
As long as global marginal benefits exceed every nation’s own marginal benefits, countries will either want to avoid
participating or avoid complying fully if they do participate. Successful international cooperation must change these
incentives (Barrett and Stavins 2003).
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1.2  Looking Forward
Despite its strengths, because the Kyoto Protocol’s ambitious targets apply only to the short
term and only to some industrialized nations, the agreement imposes relatively high costs and
generates minor short-term benefits, while failing to provide a real solution.   Thus, some analysts
see the agreement as “deeply flawed” (Victor 2001; Cooper 2001; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002,
2004).  Others, however, see it as an acceptable or good first step (Grubb 2003; Michaelowa 2003).
But virtually everyone agrees that the current framework is not sufficient to the overall challenge
and that further steps will be required.
8  
Since the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, scientific consensus regarding the likelihood of
future climate change due to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases has grown significantly
(Watson 2001, Pachauri 2008).  The 2007 Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has further focused public attention on the growing scientific
consensus.  Economic analysis increasingly points to the wisdom of policy action (Shogren and
Toman 2000; Kolstad and Toman 2001; Nordhaus 2008a, 2008b).
9 As Eileen Claussen, President
of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, wrote in 2003, “whether or not the Protocol enters
into force, the same fundamental challenge remains: engaging all countries that are major emitters
of greenhouse gases in a common long-term effort.  We need a durable strategy that can take us
beyond Kyoto” (Claussen 2003, p. ii).
The negotiation of a post-2012 global climate policy architecture, whether it builds on Kyoto
or launches a fundamentally new approach, provides an opportunity to consider a significant
dilemma.  The Kyoto Protocol came into force without U.S. participation or meaningful participation
by developing countries; its effects on climate change will be trivial; but the economic and scientific
consensus points to the need for a credible international approach.
10  What can be done?  A
reasonable starting point is the UNFCCC, which has been ratified by 193 countries — including the
United States — and which entered into force in 1994.  Among other things, the UNFCCC
established the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” meaning that all nations
should engage in the solution (because of the global-commons nature of the problem) but that
different countries could participate in different ways (United Nations 1992).  We offer a suggestion
of a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic way forward.11About one-half of the significant growth in China’s CO2 emissions in the early part of this decade is attributable to
export growth, one-third to capital formation, and most of the rest to consumption by households and government
institutions (Guan et al. 2009).  Some of these trends may have slowed due to the global recession in 2008-2009.
12  Non-OECD countries accounted for 53 percent of energy-related CO2 emissions by 2006, and are expected to surpass
60 percent of energy-related CO2 emissions by 2020 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2009).
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2.  A THREE-PART POLICY ARCHITECTURE
Our proposal for a post-2012 international global climate policy agreement contains three
essential elements:  a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved
in meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of the flexibility
offered by market-based policy instruments.  This architecture is consistent with fundamental
aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global climate change.
2.1  Expanding Participation
The vast majority of the accumulated stock of anthropogenic CO2 in the Earth’s atmosphere
was emitted by sources in industrialized countries.  Therefore, from the perspective of distributional
equity, it can certainly be argued that industrialized countries should take serious actions to reduce
their emissions before developing countries are asked to make their own contributions to such
efforts.  This is part of the thinking behind the “common but differentiated responsibilities” phrase
in the UNFCCC, and it remains a forceful argument frequently made by a number of developing
countries, most notably India (Toman, Chakravorty, and Gupta 2003).
It is ironic that distributional equity might therefore favor a relatively narrow coalition of
action, like that embodied in the Annex I list.  It is equally ironic that efficiency, or more accurately,
cost-effectiveness, favors a broader coalition of action.  This is because the criteria of efficiency and
cost-effectiveness focus on the margin, that is, are forward-looking.  Indeed, broad participation —
by major industrialized nations and key developing countries — is essential to address this global
commons problem effectively and efficiently.
2.1.1  Four Reasons for Employing a Broad Set of Participants
The share of global emissions attributable to developing countries is significant and growing
rapidly.  China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest emitter of CO2 in 2006.  The rate
of growth in China’s emissions is even more important:  China emitted 8 percent of global
anthropogenic CO2 in 1981, 14 percent in 2002, and about 21 percent by 2008 (Gregg et al. 2008).
11
More broadly, developing countries are likely to account for more than half of global emissions by
the year 2020, if not before (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000; Pies and Schröder 2002).
12
In addition to being an important and growing source of emissions, developing countries also
provide the greatest opportunities for relatively low-cost emissions reductions (Watson 2001).  It
would therefore be unnecessarily costly to focus emissions-reductions activities exclusively in the
developed world.  Inclusion of key developing countries in a future climate regime can reduce
overall costs dramatically.  According to one estimate, achieving the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions13In July 2009, the major developing country emitters rejected a proposal to reduce global emissions 50 percent by 2050
(again, from an unspecified base), though industrialized countries would have cut their own emissions by 80 percent to
further that goal, under the agreement.
14For example, EU countries suggested during a  meeting of the European Council in Brussels in 2008 that they would
cut emissions more significantly (30 percent below 1990 levels, rather than 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2020) if
other countries made commitments to larger reductions.
15Models also suggest that international emissions trading could decrease these estimated carbon leakage rates by about
one-half (Paltsev 2001).
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targets using  a system of international tradable permits — if implemented only for the industrialized
countries (as in the Kyoto Protocol) — could reduce costs by 50 percent, but if such a system were
to include major developing countries as well, costs could be lowered to 25 percent of what they
otherwise would be (Edmonds et al. 1997).
There is a third reason to ensure that a post-2012 international climate policy architecture
includes key developing countries.  The United States and several other industrialized countries have
signaled their unwillingness to commit to significant emissions reductions without their
participation.  For example, in the months leading up to Kyoto, the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 in
support of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which stated that the United States should not approve any
agreement in Kyoto that did not impose binding emission reduction targets on major developing
countries, as well as industrialized nations.  More recently, the G8 countries declared after a July
2008 meeting in Hokkaido, Japan that “all major economies” should contribute to a target of
reducing global emissions 50 percent (from an unspecified base) by 2050, code words for their
desire to include countries such as China and India in any formal compact (Agarwala 2008).
13
The United States must be involved in any meaningful post-2012 architecture.  It is the
world’s second-largest emitter and the largest historical contributor to the current stock of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. But without broad-based global participation, meaningful
participation by the United States is unlikely.  Other industrialized countries may also be willing to
agree to more stringent cuts in emissions if the United States, China, and other parties who did not
take on targets in the Kyoto Protocol are included in a post-2012 architecture.
14 
A fourth reason to include developing countries in a post-2012 global climate policy
architecture is to ensure the environmental effectiveness of emissions reductions by participating
countries.  If developing countries are not included in an agreement, comparative advantage in the
production of carbon-intensive goods and services may shift outside the coalition of participating
countries, making developing countries’ economies more carbon intensive than they otherwise
would be, through emissions leakage.
Estimates from computable general equilibrium models of potential carbon leakage rates
under a global climate regime range from 5 percent to 34 percent (Paltsev 2001).
15  High leakage
rates would erase environmental gains from emissions reductions by participating countries.  Rather
than helping developing countries move onto less carbon-intensive paths of development, the16Comprehensive studies through the mid-1990s found little or no evidence of impacts of environmental regulations on
trade patterns, although the same studies established that such regulations were costly (Jaffe et al. 1995, Levinson 1996).
Subsequent analyses established empirical evidence for the phenomenon, but for environmental regulations outside of
the climate realm.  Tests of the theory are complicated by unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity (Brunnermeier
and Levinson 2004).  This is because unobserved industry and country traits can be correlated with the likelihood of
regulation and the export of pollution-intensive goods.  Environmental regulation often appears in high-income countries
with substantial international trade, but does trade influence pollution regulation or vice-versa?  Recent studies have
established that polluting industries may be exported where trade is between high and low-standard countries, and
industries are particularly mobile (Ederington et al. 2005).
17We consider the European cap-and-trade system and RGGI in more detail below.
18International agreements under the United Nations are approved on the basis of one country, one vote; and developing
countries greatly outnumber industrialized nations.
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industrialized world would be pushing those nations onto more carbon-intensive growth paths,
increasing their cost of joining the coalition later.
16
Some have argued that because current differences in carbon costs between the United States
(where there are voluntary and mandatory regional markets) and Europe (in the EU Emissions
Trading System) have not affected industrial location decisions, leakage is not a key concern for
future international climate policy (Victor 2007).  However, it is simply too early to judge the effects
of European and American emissions policies in this regard.  Meaningful carbon trading in the
European Union did not begin until January 2008.  Trading began in the largest regional market in
the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), in 2009.
17 The extent to which
differences in EU-US carbon costs will affect trade flows and carbon intensity depends on expected
prices over the next 10 or 20 years for firms considering long-lived capital investments.  It would
be a mistake to conclude that because visible leakage has not yet occurred among wealthy countries
that it will be an unimportant phenomenon under future climate policy scenarios.
2.1.2  Cost-Effectiveness and Distributional Equity
If a post-2012 international climate policy architecture is to be meaningful, the large and
rapidly-growing developing countries must be involved, due to the magnitude of their current
emissions, their expected rates of growth in emissions, their lower costs of emissions reductions, the
increased likelihood of U.S. participation and willingness by other industrialized countries to engage
in deeper emissions reductions, and the possibility of carbon leakage.  However, on equity grounds,
it is not reasonable to expect developing nations to incur significant emissions-reduction costs in the
short term, because it would slow their economic development.  And it can surely be argued on an
ethical basis that industrialized countries should take the first emission-reduction steps on their own.
Industrialized countries — almost by definition — are responsible for the bulk of anthropogenic-
based concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
This poses a policy conundrum.  On the one hand, for purposes of environmental
performance and cost effectiveness, key developing countries must participate in an international
effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but on the other hand, for purposes of distributional
equity (and international political pragmatism
18), they cannot be expected to incur the brunt of the19For perspectives from three key developing countries — China, India, and Brazil — see Longhai (2008), Parikh (2008),
and Reis (2005).  Also, see: Agarwala (2008), Cao (2008), Garnaut, Song, and Woo (2009), Somanathan (2008), and
Teng et al. (2008).
20Game-theoretic analyses suggest that the use of formulas can render negotiations more likely to succeed (Harstad
2008).
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consequent costs.  The solution is that these countries must get on the “global climate policy train”
without necessarily paying full fare.  How can this be accomplished?
19
Achieving developing country participation may require a trigger mechanism, imposing
binding commitments only when per capita income, emissions per capita, or some other measure of
development has reached a predetermined level.  But there is no reason to limit thinking to such a
simple, dichotomous instrument.  Rather, a preferable approach would be continuous “growth
targets” that become more stringent for individual developing counties as those countries become
more wealthy (Lutter 2000).
A growth target is not a number, but an equation or set of equations that relate targeted
emissions to per-capita income and other variables.  Two necessary characteristics of a growth target
formulation are that it not create perverse incentives that would encourage nations to increase their
emissions and that it should be relatively simple, so as not to create impediments to negotiation
(Aldy, Baron, and Tubiana 2003).
This is a natural extension of the progressive target allocation present in the Kyoto Protocol.
The extension is from the industrialized world to the developing world, and from the cross-sectional
dimension to the temporal dimension.  The Kyoto Protocol’s targets exhibit positive correlation
between national wealth (in particular, gross domestic product — GDP — per capita) and the degree
of targeted emissions reduction.  In fact, the Kyoto targets exhibit an “income elasticity of
reductions” of about 0.14, that is, for a 10 percent increase in per-capita GDP, the targets — on
average — are about 1.4 percent more stringent (Frankel 1999, 2005).  Though this was not a formal
goal of the Kyoto Protocol (the positive income elasticity can simply be observed in the Protocol’s
negotiated targets), a post-2012 international climate architecture could incorporate specific
formulas ex ante for increasing developing country participation over time.
2.1.3  A Formulaic Approach to Allocating Responsibility
Specific emissions targets for all countries, and for each five-year period remaining in this
century, could emerge from a formula that would generate targets based on three elements:  short-
term progressivity, latecomer catch-up, and equalization, while constraining targets so as not to
impose costs over the century exceeding an average of 1 percent of GDP per year, or 5 percent of
GDP for any country in any period (Frankel 2008).
20  The “short-term progressivity” factor would
adjust emissions targets based upon per capita income (applying the income elasticity of reductions
implied by the Kyoto targets).  “Latecomer catch-up” avoids rewarding countries that failed to curb
their emissions after 1990 (the Kyoto baseline year).  This would include countries such as Canada,
which ratified the Protocol, but is unlikely to comply; countries such as the United States, which did
not ratify the agreement; and countries such as China, which did not take on targets at Kyoto.  This
would help close the gap between 1990 emissions and the starting points of latecomers to the21For other approaches to engaging developing countries, such as ones that emphasize integrating development objectives
with global climate policy objectives, see:  Agarwala (2008), Cao (2008), Hall, Pizer, Levi, and Ueno (2008), Heller and
Shukla (2003), Keeler and Thompson (2008), Somanathan (2008), Teng et al. (2008), and Victor (2008).
22This contrasts dramatically with the situation in Europe and elsewhere, where economies were stagnant or grew much
more slowly.  Furthermore, emissions of CO2 from the United Kingdom, Germany, and Russia fell significantly
subsequent to 1990 (the Kyoto Protocol’s baseline year) for reasons having nothing to do with climate or other
environmental policy.  Emissions fell in the United Kingdom because of structural changes in the domestic coal industry
initiated by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s government (1979–1990); emissions fell in Germany because
reunification led to the closure of energy-inefficient plants in the former East Germany; and emissions fell in Russia
because of its economic collapse in the 1990s (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002).  Importantly, it has been estimated that
80 percent of the European Union’s CO2 reductions under the Kyoto Protocol would be achieved by two countries —
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process.  Finally, the “equalization factor” would move all countries in the direction of global
average per capita emissions in the second half of the century, asking rich countries to make up,
somewhat, for the fact that they previously enjoyed the benefits of unfettered CO2 emissions,
creating an environmental problem for which poor countries bear disproportionate impacts (Frankel
2008).
In the short term, such indexed targets for major developing countries could be set at
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions levels, but they would become more stringent over time as the
countries became wealthier.  In Frankel’s (2008) proposal, for example, China’s emissions target
would be equivalent to BAU emissions until 2040, slightly below BAU between 2040 and 2045, and
then it would begin to drop.  The smaller East Asian countries and Sub-Saharan Africa would have
targets equal to BAU for the remainder of the century.  Keeping even poor countries at or near BAU
emissions is an important goal, since it prevents the possibility of significant carbon leakage.
If provision is not made for such a mechanism that includes developing countries at low or
no cost to them, then analysis inevitably points to a trade-off between cost-effectiveness (or
efficiency) and distributional equity (Sugiyama and Deshun 2004).  Thus, such a mechanism will
likely be necessary to induce meaningful developing country participation.  If emissions targets at
BAU for the short- to medium-run (or even the long run for some regions) were combined with an
appropriate international trading program (discussed below), this could provide a direct economic
incentive (subsidy) for developing-country participation.  Developing countries could fully
participate without incurring prohibitive costs (or even any costs in the short term).  That is, cost-
effectiveness and distributional equity could both be addressed.
21
2.2  An Extended Time Path of Targets
Global climate change is a long-term problem, due to the fact that the relevant greenhouse
gases remain in the atmosphere for decades to centuries, combined with the reality that significant
technological change will be required to bring down costs to levels where greater actions can be
taken.  The Kyoto Protocol fails to reflect these fundamentally important realities with its short-term
targets, an average 5 percent reduction from 1990 levels by the 2008–2012 “first commitment
period.”  This apparently modest reduction translates into a severe 25–30 percent cut for the United
States from its BAU emissions path.  The reason for this is that the United States economy grew at
an exceptionally rapid rate during the 1990s, exhibiting a remarkable 37 percent increase in real
GDP from 1990 to 2000.
22Germany and the United Kingdom, facilitated via the EU bubble that is part of the Protocol (Andersen 2002).  These
factors help explain the very different perspectives on the Kyoto Protocol held by Europeans and Americans, although
other, broader phenomena are also at work (Kagan 2002).
23For a broader survey of the relationship between technological change and the environment, see Jaffe, Newell, and
Stavins (2003).  For an analysis of the implications of combining such an intertemporal pattern of targets with gradual
expansion of the coalition of nations that take on targets, see den Elzen (2002).
24The word “target” should be taken generically to refer not only to emission targets (as in the Kyoto Protocol, and as
described above), but also “intensity targets,” that is, emissions per unit of gross domestic product.  For that matter, the
proposal we offer here is also consistent with a time-path of targets denominated in purely financial units, that is, carbon
prices implemented through taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels (Cooper 2008).
25For the global goal of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at twice pre-industrial levels (that is,
approximately 550 parts per million), Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds (1996) estimated that the cost-effective time path
of emissions would involve global emissions peaking in 2030.  For stabilization of CO2 at 450 ppm, the general shape
of trajectories remains, but it is necessary for global emissions to peak and begin to decrease much sooner.  The
recommended intertemporal pattern of emissions targets is also consistent with recommendations for the use of “intensity
targets,” as highlighted in the United States by the National Commission on Energy Policy (2004).
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Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s targets seek to achieve “too little, too fast:”  They do little about
the problem, but are unreasonable for countries that enjoyed significant economic growth after 1990.
Two elements can ameliorate this problem:  firm but moderate targets in the short term to avoid
rendering large parts of the capital stock prematurely obsolete, and flexible but considerably more
stringent targets for the long term to motivate (now and in the future) technological change, which
in turn is needed to bring costs down over time (Goulder and Schneider 1999; Jaffe, Newell, and
Stavins 1999; Pershing and Tudela 2003; Newell 2008).  Specifically, emissions targets ought to
start out at BAU levels, and then gradually depart from BAU levels.  Globally, these intertemporal
emissions targets should not be monotonically increasing, but should reach a maximum level and
then begin to decrease — eventually becoming substantially more severe than the constraints
implied by the Kyoto Protocol’s short-term targets.
23
Precise, numerical emissions targets for long time horizons, if they are inflexible, are
impractical due to uncertainty over future growth, technological change, and the science of climate
change and its effects. Some of the considerable uncertainty throughout the policy-
economics-biophysical system will be resolved over time (Richels, Manne, and Wigley 2004,
Mendelsohn 2008).  Thus, long-term targets must retain some flexibility; the emissions target
formulas proposed by Frankel (2008) are a good example.
In addition, since long-run emissions targets require that current leaders (especially elected
officials) bind future political leaders to costly commitments, many have pointed out that long-term
targets are dynamically inconsistent and must incorporate constraints representing the economic
reality that no country is likely to abide by an unenforceable international agreement that causes
great economic disruption in any particular year, or set of years (Frankel 2008).
24
The pattern we suggest is consistent with estimates of the least-cost time path of emissions
for achieving long-term greenhouse-gas concentration targets:  short-term increases in emissions —
just slightly below the BAU path — and subsequent emission reductions (Wigley, Richels, and
Edmonds 1996; Manne and Richels 1997).
25  26It is not necessary that the (upstream) level of compliance be the same as the (possibly downstream) level of initial
allocation. There are also two regional U.S. tradable permit markets for nitrogen oxides (NOx) in southern California
and the northeast and mid-Atlantic states, created primarily to reduce concentrations of ground-level ozone.
27Norway introduced a carbon tax in 1991. Despite its considerable magnitude and consequent induced increases in fuel
prices, impacts on CO2 emissions were modest, in part because of extensive tax exemptions (Bruvoll and Larsen 2004).
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Such a time path of long-term targets, put in place now, would be consistent with what is
often denigrated as “politics as usual.”  That is, politicians are frequently condemned for the fact that
in representative democracies there are strong incentives to place costs on future, not current, voters
and, if possible, future generations.  It is typically the politically pragmatic strategy.  In the case of
global climate policy, it can also be the scientifically correct and economically rational approach.
Frankel points out that his “politically feasible” proposal of emissions target formulas implies a
similar time path of emissions reductions (and carbon prices) as the benefit-cost paths proposed by
economic models — small cuts now, big cuts later (2008).
2.3  Market-Based Policy Instruments
The final component of the three-part policy architecture we propose is necessary to achieve
global cost-effectiveness and thereby to render the overall architecture politically achievable:
working through the market rather than against it.  There is widespread agreement that conventional
regulatory approaches cannot do the job, certainly not at acceptable costs.  To keep costs down in
the short term and bring them down even lower in the long term through technological change, it
is essential to embrace market-based instruments as the chief means of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions (Stavins 1997; Lackner 2005; Metcalf 2009).
On a domestic level in some countries, systems of tradable permits — otherwise known as
“cap-and-trade” — might be used to achieve national targets.  In an emissions permit–trading
system, sources that have low costs of control have an incentive to take on added reductions, so that
they can sell their excess permits to sources that face relatively high control costs and would hence
wish to reduce their control efforts (Hockenstein, Stavins, and Whitehead 1997).  This is the same
mechanism that was used in the United States to eliminate leaded gasoline from the market in the
1980s at a savings of more than $250 million per year (Stavins 2003), and the same mechanism
being used to cut sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from power plants in the United States by 50
percent, at a savings estimated to be $1 billion per year (Schmalensee, et al. 1998; Stavins 1998;
Ellerman, et al. 2000).  Of the two systems, the better model for climate change policy is the
upstream lead-rights system (analogous to trading based on the carbon content of fossil fuels), rather
than the downstream SO2 emissions-trading system.
26 
For some countries, systems of domestic carbon taxes may be more attractive than cap-and-
trade approaches.
27  Rather than imposing a cap on the quantity of pollution, and allowing regulated
firms to trade emissions permits to establish a market price for pollution, a tax imposes a specific
price on pollution and allows firms to decide how much to pollute in response.  A tax has an effect
on firms’ decisions that is essentially identical to the effect of the permit price created by a
cap-and-trade policy; polluters decide, for each ton of emissions, whether to abate that ton (incurring
the resulting abatement costs) or to pay the tax and continue to emit that ton.  Domestic carbon taxes
— typically in the form of upstream taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels — have frequently28Others have argued in favor of an international tax regime.  See, for example:  Cooper (1998, 2008); McKibbin and
Wilcoxen (2002); Pizer (2002); Newell and Pizer (2003); and Nordhaus (2008a).
29For a description of the origin and evolution of the concept in climate policy deliberations, an assessment of its potential
application as a domestic policy instrument, and an evaluation of potential problems it would present if adopted as an
international policy instrument, see Jacoby and Ellerman (2004).
30Currently, the majority of excess permits (allowable emissions in excess of BAU emissions, or so-called ?hot air?) is
found in a relatively small number of nations in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, since Kyoto's
1990 baseline failed to account for substantially reduced industrial activity in these countries after the collapse of the
Soviet Union.  Some have pointed out that the possibility of collusion in a permit market among such a small number
of potential sellers becomes quite likely (Manne and Richels 2004; Springer and Varilek 2004).
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been recommended by academics (Metcalf 2007; Metcalf and Weisbach 2009),
28 but have received
considerably less support in the policy community.
Another promising market-based approach is a hybrid of tax and tradable-permit systems —
that is, an ordinary cap-and-trade system, plus a government promise to sell additional permits at
a stated price (Roberts and Spence 1976; Kopp, et al. 2000; Pizer 2002; McKibbin and Wilcoxen
2002).  This creates a price (and thereby cost) ceiling, and has hence been labeled a safety-valve
system.
29  Likewise, a price floor can be created by a government promise to purchase allowances
from the market at a given price.  The combination of the two approaches — known as a “price
collar” — may have particular merit in the climate context (Murray, Newell, and Pizer 2009).
Among these alternative market-based policy instruments, the one which is emerging as the
preferred approach among industrialized countries is the particular version of emissions trading
known as cap-and-trade  (Jaffe and Stavins 2008).  At the same time, the emission-reduction credit
system created under the Kyoto Protocol — the Clean Development Mechanism — enjoys a solid
constituency of support in the developing world (Somanathan 2008).
2.3.1 The Promise and Problems of International Emissions Trading
The Kyoto Protocol includes in Article 17 a system whereby the parties to the agreement can
engage in trading their “assigned amounts,” that is, their reduction targets, translated into
quantitative terms of emissions (United Nations 1997).  In theory, such a system of international
tradable permits — if implemented only for the industrialized countries (as under the Kyoto
Protocol) — could reduce costs by 50 percent.  If such a system also included major developing
countries, costs could be lowered to 25 percent of what they otherwise would be (Edmonds et al.
1997).
An undisputed attraction — in theory — of an international trading approach is that the
equilibrium allocation of permits, the market-determined permit price, and the aggregate costs of
abatement are independent of the initial allocation of permits among countries.  However, this is
only true as long as particularly perverse types of transaction costs are not prevalent (Stavins 1995)
and individual parties—be they nations or firms—do not have market power (Hahn 1984).  The
latter concern is a real one in the Kyoto context.
30  In any event, the initial allocation can be highly
significant in distributional terms, implying possibly massive international wealth transfers.  Some
analysts have highlighted this as a major objection to an international carbon trading regime (Cooper31Note that the Kyoto Protocol explicitly provides for national sovereignty regarding domestic instrument choice in
Article 2.  This might be a necessary element of a future, politically viable international agreement.
32In such cases, achieving the potential cost savings of international trading would require some form of project-by-
project credit program, such as the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). But theory and experience
with such programs indicates they are less likely to facilitate major cost savings because of large transaction costs,
government participation, and the absence of well-functioning markets (Michaelowa, et al. 2003).
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1998, 2008), but it is essentially because of this feature that a permit system can be used to address
cost-effectiveness and distributional equity.
If an international trading system is used, it must be designed to facilitate integration with
domestic policies that nations use to achieve their respective domestic targets.
31  In the extreme, if
all countries use domestic tradable permit systems to meet their national targets (that is, allocate
shares from the international permit system to private domestic parties), then an international system
can — in theory — be perfectly cost-effective.  But if some countries use non-trading approaches,
such as greenhouse gas taxes or fixed-quantity standards — which seems likely — cost
minimization is not ensured (Hahn and Stavins 1999).
32  Thus, individual nations’ choices of
domestic policy instruments to meet their targets can substantially limit the cost-saving potential of
an international trading program.  In this realm, a trade-off exists between the degree of domestic
sovereignty and the degree of cost-effectiveness.  An emerging answer, which we discuss below,
may be the linkage of independent domestic and regional cap-and-trade systems, thereby facilitating
cost-effective trades among individual sources (firms), both domestically and internationally.
2.3.2 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
Not very long ago, most observers would have predicted that few, if any, European countries
would employ cap-and-trade systems, given the European Union’s strenuous opposition to such
approaches dating to back to the time of the Kyoto Protocol.  But after some initial flirtations with
carbon tax considerations, the EU launched a continent-wide trading system – the largest existing
international cap-and-trade system for CO2 – to meet its emissions reduction targets under the
Protocol (Kruger and Pizer 2004).
The Kyoto Protocol establishes a bubble for the European Union, that is, it sets a cap on CO2
emissions for the EU as a whole, allocated by the EU to it member states.  Under this cap, the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was established in 2005, and after a pilot
phase, entered its more meaningful Kyoto phase in January 2008. 
The EU ETS is now the world's largest emissions trading system, covering almost 12,000
facilities in 27 countries as of 2008, and accounting for nearly one-half of EU CO2 emissions
(Ellerman and Buchner 2007, Ellerman and Joskow 2008, Ellerman 2008, Convery and Redmond
2007).   The Kyoto Protocol's emissions caps did not begin to bind until 2008, so the pilot phase of
the EU ETS (2005-2007) was designed to set up the institutional and operating structures necessary
for trading.  The cap in the EU system in this pilot phase was a very small reduction (a few
percentage points) below expected emissions in the absence of the policy.   Given that the
system was designed not to begin to bind in meaningful ways until 2008, which turned out to be a
time of global recession (and hence falling CO2 emissions), it is much too soon to determine with14
any reliability the impact of this new carbon market on emissions, or the cost savings from the EU
ETS over more prescriptive approaches.
Some see the EU ETS as a prototype for a post-2012 international global climate regime,
noting that the 30 states involved constitute an increasingly diverse set of sovereign countries; for
example, per capita income in Romania and Bulgaria, who joined upon EU accession in 2007, is
only one-third more than per capita income in China; and per capita income in Ireland is five percent
higher than in the United States (Ellerman 2008).  Many of the problems encountered and addressed
by the EU ETS may be similar to those a fully international trading architecture would encounter.
The EU ETS has not been without its conflicts.  Nine of the ten East European countries have
sued the European Commission over their allotted emissions caps for 2008-2012.  But the“club
benefits” of continued membership in the European Union, including free labor and capital flows
and access to broader markets, have apparently outweighed the costs of the EU ETS for these poorer
nations, as they have chosen to remain within the system, rather than dropping out (Ellerman 2008).
2.3.3 The Emergence of Climate Cap-and-Trade Systems in the United States
Several domestic tradable permit systems for CO2 are in place in the United States.  Although
the U.S. government (Senate) did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, some states have enacted policies
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.  The largest U.S. market-based initiative is the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade system among 10 northeastern states, initiated
in 2003.  The trading program covers electricity generators within the 10 states and began in earnest
in 2009.  Allowances under RGGI are auctioned, and firms trade allowances and various financial
derivatives (including futures and options contracts) in a secondary market.  Trading in the
secondary market was active during the first quarter of 2009 (Potomac Economics 2009). The RGGI
CO2 emissions cap for 2009-2014  roughly equals the sum of recent emissions among covered
generators, then declines by 2.5 percent per year from 2015 through 2018.  In 2008, the State of
California took a serious step toward establishing its own cap-and-trade system for energy-related
CO2 emissions to meet a target of achieving emissions in 2020 equal to those in 1990, a goal
established by state law in 2006 (Jaffe and Stavins 2008).
In June 2009, the Federal government in the United States took its most significant steps to
date toward putting in place a national cap-and-trade policy to reduce CO2 emissions, with the
passage in the House of Representatives of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, also
known as the Waxman-Markey bill, named for the two Members of Congress who co-sponsored the
bill.  This legislation would cap national greenhouse gas emissions by nearly all significant sources,
including coal-fired power plants, factories, natural gas suppliers, and fuels, setting up a cap-and-
trade system to achieve emissions reductions.  If similar legislation is passed by the U.S. Senate, the
emissions cap would be phased in over several years for various sectors.  The target reductions for
covered sources in the bill amount to 17 percent cuts below 2005 levels by 2020, and progressively
steeper cuts as time goes on (42 percent by 2030, and 83 percent by 2050). 
2.3.4 Linking National and Regional Cap-and-Trade Systems
In addition to the nations of the European Union and the United States, a number of other
major countries in the industrialized world are currently considering the adoption of national cap-33Such linkage of domestic cap-and-trade systems is initiated by agreements between respective governments, but —
importantly — it leads to trading not among governments, but among firms within the respective countries.  This
circumvents the problems inherent in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol for international emissions trading, which as we
emphasized earlier is unlikely to be effective, if indeed it is utilized at all (Hahn and Stavins 1999)
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and-trade systems to reduce CO2 emissions,  including Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand
(Jaffe and Stavins 2008).  The increasing number of existing, planned, and proposed regional,
national, and sub-national cap-and-trade policies for CO2 emissions reduction raises the possibility,
indeed, the probability, that the linkage of these systems will constitute a significant element of the
a future international climate policy architecture.  In this context, linkage refers to the recognition
of the allowances (permits) from one system for use in meeting compliance requirements in another.
The potential benefits of such linkage of domestic systems include cost savings from increasing the
scope of the market, greater market liquidity, reduced price volatility, lessened market power, and
reduced carbon leakage (Jaffe and Stavins 2008).
33
There are several ways in which international linkage could occur.  Domestic cap-and-trade
programs could be linked directly, either unilaterally or bilaterally.  With a direct bilateral linkage,
both domestic cap-and-trade policies would recognize allowances from the other system toward the
emissions caps of permitted entities (firms and/or plants).  Unilateral linkages may arise in which
one system recognizes allowances from the other, but the recognition is not mutual.  Allowance
prices would converge with direct bilateral linkage, so long as there were no constraints on inter-
system trades, and with unilateral linkage as long as the buying system’s price was higher than the
selling system’s price – no trading would take place if the opposite were true (Jaffe and Stavins
2008).  
A potential problem is that direct linkage of cap-and-trade systems will lead to the automatic
transmission of cost-containment elements — banking, borrowing, safety valves, and price collars
— from one system to the other.  This raises concerns for some countries, because of the possible
loss of control of their domestic systems, and raises the possibility that systems would need to be
harmonized in advance of linkage, so that such undesirable outcomes would be prevented.  
Importantly, this necessity for prior harmonization can be eliminated through the substitution
of indirect links for direct ones.  In particular, if each of a number of cap-and-trade systems link with
a common emission-reduction credit system, then all of the cap-and-trade systems will be linked
(indirectly), achieving the benefits of cost reduction, greater market liquidity, reduced price
volatility, lessened market power, and reduced carbon leakage, but without the unintentional
transmission of cost-containment mechanisms from one system to another, thereby reducing, if not
eliminating the need for prior harmonization.
In theory, if a cap-and-trade system is linked with a credit system, prices will converge in
the two systems.  And prices in two cap-and-trade systems which are indirectly linked will also
converge, as credits flow to the system with the highest price (Jaffe and Stavins 2008).  With a
sufficient supply of credits, prices in all systems will converge, though this may not occur if binding
constraints are imposed on the use of credits and allowances from other systems.  
This is a rather good description of what appears to be evolving, that is, the emergence of
regional and national cap-and-trade systems in the industrialized world, each of which allows offsets34Analysts expect that the CDM will have generated more than 2.7 billion CERs by the end of 2012, the majority of them
for projects in China, with each CER representing an emissions reduction of one metric ton of CO2 equivalent (Jaffe and
Stavins 2008).
35Other concerns include: distributional consequences of raising prices in some systems and lowering them in others;
capital flows between regions and countries; reduction of control over domestic tradable permit system design; and
incentives in setting future caps in these disparate systems.
36For example, the United Kingdom is the largest emissions allowance importer in the ETS, importing 14 percent of its
verified emissions, worth about £350 million.  But this still represents a very small portion – less than one-tenth of one
percent – of its total imports of goods and services, about £415 billion (Ellerman 2008).
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to some degree from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the emission-reduction credit
system in developing countries that was established under the Kyoto Protocol.  When a cap-and-
trade system is linked with the CDM, tradable credits are awarded to a buyer (which may face a
mandatory cap on emissions) for certified (but voluntary) emissions reductions by another party.
Under the CDM, certified emissions reductions (CERs) are awarded for voluntary emission
reduction projects in developing countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but are not among the
countries subject to emissions limitations.  The industrialized countries that did take on emissions
targets under the Protocol can use CERs to meet these commitments.
34
The CDM has begun to be linked with multiple cap-and-trade systems; CERs can be used
to meet emissions commitments within the EU-ETS, and RGGI, under some circumstances.  It is
too early, however, to assess the impact of these linkages on allowance (or credit) prices, trading,
and emissions in the EU ETS-RGGI-CDM markets, because the EU ETS began in earnest only in
2008 and RGGI in 2009.  
A potential concern associated with linking cap-and-trade systems through a common
emission-reduction credit systems is “additionality” – credit systems, including the CDM, have been
plagued by questions about the actual emissions reductions represented by credits, because of the
difficulty of establishing a baseline against which reductions can be measured.  Linking credit
systems with cap-and-trade system passes this worry along to the latter system, in which it would
otherwise not be a significant concern.  Thus, there is something of a trade-off between the potential
economic and environmental gains of such a bottom-up system of global indirect linkage, on the one
hand, and the potential economic and environmental losses that such linkage can bring about if
additionality problems are severe.
35
2.3.5 The Role of Emissions Trading in a Future International Climate Policy Architecture
One of the key objections to the efficacy of a post-2012 international climate policy
architecture with international emissions trading as a core element is that industrialized countries
will not support such a policy, once the cross-border financial flows implied by trading allocations
that favor developing countries (in order to prompt their accession to the agreement) become
apparent (Victor 2007, Cooper 1998).  However, despite the significant variation in per capita
income across EU ETS member states, which has grown over time as an increasing number of
poorer states have joined, this has not turned out to be a point of controversy (Ellerman 2008).  This
may be due to the fact that, while trading is active, financial flows from emissions trading represent
a very small portion of total imports and exports.
3637By the time of the COPs in Bonn (summer 2001) and Marrakech (fall 2001), China and the G-77 (the coalition of
developing nations) had, in effect, dropped their opposition to international emissions trading.
38“It has been said that “democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried
from time to time.” This is the most common form of the quotation, and is reproduced from debate in the House of
Commons, November 11, 1947 (James 1974).
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In addition, any viable alternative that engages the major developing countries in an
international climate policy architecture will likely involve some form of financial transfers from
industrialized to developing countries.  Critics of the financial flows implied by permit allocations
skewed toward developing countries have suggested that industrialized countries engage developing
countries by making direct financial contributions for the implementation of climate-friendly
policies that these countries support, such as investment in clean natural gas infrastructure in China,
or assistance with safe nuclear power in India (Victor 2007).  Under this approach, unlike in the case
of generous emissions allowances within an international permit trading regime, industrialized
countries would obtain no direct return for these flows in the form of own compliance-cost
reductions.  Thus, it is hard to imagine there would be much support for this approach among
industrialized nations.
The experience of the EU ETS, the strong U.S. preference for trading, and support voiced
by some key developing countries
37 represent important political arguments for this element of a
future international climate policy architecture.  International permit trading — not among countries,
per se, but among firms within and across countries — thus remains a promising approach to
achieving global greenhouse targets, despite the challenges that exist.  It is probably fair to state that
the more one studies international tradable permit systems to address global climate change, the
more one comes to believe that this is the worst possible approach — except, of course, for all the
others (bringing to mind Winston Churchill’s famous observation about democracy).
38
3.  CONCLUSION
The three-part global climate policy architecture we have proposed builds upon the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change and could potentially serve as a successor to the Kyoto
Protocol.  For such an approach to work, key nations have to be involved, including major
developing countries through the use of economic trigger mechanisms such as growth targets.  In
addition, cost-effective time paths of targets are required:  firm, but moderate in the short term, and
in the long term, much more stringent and flexible.  Finally, market-based policy instruments ought
to be part of the package, whether emissions trading, carbon taxes, or hybrids of the two. 
This overall approach can be made to be scientifically sound, economically rational, and
perhaps politically pragmatic.  There is no denying that the challenges facing adoption and
successful implementation of this climate policy architecture are significant, but they need not be
insurmountable, and they are not any greater than the challenges facing other approaches to the
threat of global climate change.18
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